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CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD
PERSONS: WHEN THE RIGHT OF THE
BENEFICIARY BECOMES INDEFEASIBLE
N GENERAL, the law of Colorado regarding contracts
for the benefit of third parties follows the rules of the
majority of American courts.1 But in one important
instance the Colorado law is contrary to the weight of American authority. That instance concerns the question as to
when the right of the beneficiary becomes indefeasible so that
the parties to the contract cannot rescind it or alter its terms
without his consent.
In order to understand in just what way the Colorado
law is unusual it will be necessary to make a short analysis
of the difference between a donee or sole beneficiary and a
creditor beneficiary. First let us consider the former.
One is a donee or sole beneficiary if it appears from the
terms of the contract and surrounding circumstances that the
purpose of the promisee is to make him a gift or to confer
upon him the right against the promisor to some performance
not due from the promisee to the beneficiary.2 The chief
purpose of such a contract is to confer a benefit by way of a
gift. Now since the beneficiary has been given a right which
the courts have decided to enforce, it is clear that such right
should not be taken from him without his consent unless the
parties have reserved the power to do so. The only possible
question is as to when the right of the donee vests-is it at
the time the contract is made or not until he assents to it?
Since the gift is a benefit to him there seems no reason why
assent should not be presumed. Thus, on this basis, most
courts hold that the right of the donee becomes indefeasible
as soon as the contract is made.'
This argument, however, is not suited to the case of the
creditor beneficiary. A creditor beneficiary is one to whom
the promisee owes a duty which will be satisfied by performance by the promisor. In this type of case the promisee has
no intention to make a gift. He has made a bargain for the
'For an excellent summary of the Colorado law on the whole question, see Contractual Rights of Persons Not Parties to the Contract in Colorado, 3 Rocky Mountain Law Review 175 (1930).
'American Law Institute Restatement of Contracts, S'ec. 133.
"I Williston on Contracts 740, Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 142.
'Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 133.
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purpose of relieving himself from a liability, pecuniary or
otherwise, and it is himself and not the beneficiary whom he
intends to benefit. He has increased his own assets by arranging that his debt shall be paid by another. Thus the right
of the creditor beneficiary is not original as is that of the
donee beneficiary, but derivative; and when this debtor ceases
to have a right, his right, too, is cut off. He loses nothing by
an alteration or rescission of the contract.5 But since the
courts have given him a right to sue at law on the promise,
his right must become indefeasible at some time. This is generally held to be when he brings suit or materially changes
his position in reliance on the promise, or when the rescission
of the contract would be a fraud upon him as creditor of the
promisee.6
Thus we have seen that the right of the sole beneficiary
should, and in most jurisdictions does, vest at a much earlier
time than that of the creditor beneficiary, being based on different theoretical grounds. But, nevertheless, in Colorado
the two seem to be treated in precisely the same way.7
As far as the donee beneficiary is concerned the Colorado
cases conform to the weight of authority, uniformly holding
that unless the power to do so is reserved, the promisee cannot
alter or release the duty of the promisor to the beneficiary
without the consent of the latter. In Love vs. Clune, 24
Colorado 227, 50 Pac. 34 (1897), it was held that an
attempt to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
where the power to make such change was not reserved was
ineffectual to cut off the rights of the person first named as
beneficiary. This case concerns the policy of a fraternal benefit organization, the Locomotive Engineers Mutual Life and
Accident Association. In many jurisdictions the power to
change the beneficiary in a policy of a fraternal organization
exists without express words.8 But in Colorado even in such
a policy the reservation must be express, under this holding.
Pittinger vs. Pittinger, 28 Colo. 300, 64 Pac. 195 (1901),
is to the same effect.
'rThis is the analysis given in 1 Williston on Contracts 744.
'Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 143.
'See Rocky Mountain Law Review, cited supra, page 178.
'Restatement of Contract, Comment to Sec. 143.
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It should be further noted that in this state the reservation of a power to change the beneficiary does not of itself
divest the beneficiary of his interest, but that it becomes vested
at the moment the contract is formed, subject to a condition
subsequent. Hill vs. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 91 Colo.
551, 14 Pac. 2d 1006 (1932). Here the insured, not wishing to pay a note he had given as payment of the first premium, arranged for a cancellation of the policy. This was
done without the consent of the beneficiary. On the death
of the insured the beneficiary sued for the value of the policy
and was given judgment, the court holding that the interest
of the beneficiary was vested and could not be cut off without
her consent even though the reservation had been made. The
insured could have achieved the desired result simply by making his estate the beneficiary and then cancelling the policy.
On principle there would seem no reason for demanding this
roundabout route, but the case is in accord with earlier cases
holding that a power to change a beneficiary must be exercised in strict accordance with the terms of the reservation.
See Muller vs. Penn Mutual Life InsuranceCo., 62 Colo. 96,
Prof. W. R. Vance contends that
160 Pac. 188 (1916).
when the power to change the beneficiary is reserved the sound
view and the weight of authority are that the beneficiary has
no vested interest but only an expectancy. 31 Yale Law
Journal 343.
Colorado, then, enforces strictly the usual rule that a
donee beneficiary has a vested interest as soon as the contract
is made. Let us now see whether our law accords with the
weight of authority as regards a creditor beneficiary.
There are only two decided cases on this precise point.
These are in accord neither with the usual rule nor with each
other. In Starbird vs. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652
(1897), a grantee of lands promised to pay a mortgage which
the grantor had assumed. The grantor and grantee then
made arrangements rescinding the promise, but the mortgagee
was allowed to recover from the grantee. The court held
that the creditor beneficiary has an indefeasible right to performance as soon as the contract is made, and the promisor
and promisee have no power to discharge or vary the contract
without the consent of the beneficiary. The International
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Trust Co. vs. The Keefe Manufacturingand Investment Cc.,
40 Colo. 440, 91 Pac. 915 (1907), lays down a slightly different rule. Here a materialman sued the surety on a contractor's bond which had been given to the owner. The court
said, without distinguishing between a donee and a creditor
beneficiary, that the promisor and promisee could not vary
the terms of the bond after the beneficiary had "accepted" it.
It is not entirely clear what the court means by "accept," but
apparently the word is used as synonymous with "assent." If
this interpretation is correct then the case gives more power
to the promisor and promisee than the Starbird case, supra,
but less than the general rule. The rule as laid down here
was dictum, however, for the bond was conditional and the
condition had not been satisfied.
In conclusion, then, it may be said that Colorado, in common with many other jurisdictions, fails to distinguish between cases of donee and creditor beneficiaries. Theoretically, a distinction can and should be made, but perhaps it is
better that there be a single rule covering all types of cases, or,
if distinctions are to be drawn, that they be on practical and
equitable grounds rather than for theoretical reasons, as is
frequently done in giving insurance beneficiaries the greatest
GEORGE S. GRAHAM, Class of 1936.
possible rights.

FOR COLORADO: A CRIMINAL CODE?
We may think the law is the same if we refuse to
change the formulas. The identity is verbal only.
The formula no longer has the same correspondence with reality.-BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO in

A

Paradoxes of Legal Science.

S OLD as laws and lawyers is public dissatisfaction with

both-a dissatisfaction pervasive,

ubiquitous, and

without analogy in any other area of endeavor. Stage
and platform echo with the perennial theme of the law's delay
and the lawyer's vested interest in the evils of the status quo,
and the same theme fills many books and more editorials.
Criminal justice, in which the public as such is most obviously concerned, is the most commonly and fiercely assailed
object of all.

